Lockean Ideas as Intentional Contents

In Gabor Forrai George Kampis (ed.), Intentionality: Past and Future (2005)
The paper argues for the view advocated by Yolton that Locke's ideas are best viewed as intentional contents. Drawing on Smith and McIntyre's distincition between object- and content-theories of intentionality I seek it show that it belongs to the second category. The argument relies mainly on the analysis of Locke's discussion of meaning, the reality and adequacy of ideas and real essence.
Keywords Locke  idea  meaning  reality  real essence  adequacy  intentionality  content
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