David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Clark and Chalmers (2002) advance two hypotheses that both cognition and the mind extend into the environment. Both hypotheses are grounded in active externalism about mental content and the Parity Principle. Active externalism proposes that the external features of the environment in the present directly influence our mental contents and behavior. The Parity Principle states that a process or state in the environment is cognitive if it is functionally equivalent to a comparable intracranial cognitive process. This paper reviews two of the strongest replies to the hypotheses, namely that arguments for them commit the coupling-constitution fallacy and that the hypothesis of extended cognition is incompatible with any satisfactory criteria that distinguishes between cognitive and non-cognitive processes. This paper argues that a dynamical systems approach avoids both objections and offers a conceptual and methodological framework for an extended cognitive science. Lastly, an account of collective intentionality will be considered to show how groups of individuals can be the bearers of mental states.
|Keywords||Extended mind hypothesis dynamical systems dynamical cognitive science cognitive systems coupling-constitution fallacy extended cognition situated cognition dynamical modeling|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Zoe Drayson (2010). Extended Cognition and the Metaphysics of Mind. Cognitive Systems Research 11 (4):367-377.
Michael Silberstein & Anthony Chemero (2012). Complexity and Extended Phenomenological‐Cognitive Systems. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):35-50.
Frank van der Velde & Marc de Kamps (1998). Toward a Synthesis of Dynamical Systems and Classical Computation. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):652-653.
Tim van Gelder (1998). The Dynamical Hypothesis in Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
Matthew Botvinick (2012). Commentary: Why I Am Not a Dynamicist. Topics in Cognitive Science 4 (1):78-83.
Tony Chemero (2001). Dynamical Explanation and Mental Representations. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 5 (4):141-142.
Carlos Zednik (2011). The Nature of Dynamical Explanation. Philosophy of Science 78 (2):238-263.
Herbert Jaeger (1998). Today's Dynamical Systems Are Too Simple. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):643-644.
Ronald L. Chrisley (1998). What Might Dynamical Intentionality Be, If Not Computation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):634-635.
Arthur B. Markman (2001). Are Dynamical Systems the Answer? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (1):50-51.
Itay Shani (2013). Making It Mental: In Search for the Golden Mean of the Extended Cognition Controversy. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-26.
Randall D. Beer (1998). Framing the Debate Between Computational and Dynamical Approaches to Cognitive Science. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):630-630.
Nick Chater & Ulrike Hahn (1998). What is the Dynamical Hypothesis? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):633-634.
Added to index2010-12-09
Total downloads124 ( #31,863 of 1,911,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #181,474 of 1,911,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?