The real but dead past: A reply to braddon-Mitchell

Analysis 64 (4):358–362 (2004)
Abstract
In "How Do We Know It Is Now Now?" David Braddon-Mitchell (Analysis 2004) develops an objection to the thesis that the past is real but the future is not. He notes my response to this, namely that the past, although real, is lifeless and (a fortiori?) lacking in sentience. He argues, however, that this response, which I call 'the past is dead hypothesis', is not tenable if combined with 'special relativity'. My purpose in this reply is to argue that, on the contrary, 'special relativity' supports the thesis that the future is unreal
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    References found in this work BETA
    C. Bourne (2002). When Am I? A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (3):359 – 371.
    Citations of this work BETA
    Stephan Torre (2011). The Open Future. Philosophy Compass 6 (5):360-373.
    Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.

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