Philosophy of Science 47 (2):203-226 (1980)
|Abstract||Some features of physical science relevant for a discussion of physical explanation are mentioned. The D-N account of physical explanation is discussed, and it is seen to restrict the scope of explanation in physical science because it imposes the requirement that the explanandum must be deducible from the explanans. Analysis shows that an alternative view of scientific explanation, called the instance view, allows a wider range of physical explanations. The view is seen to be free from a certain class of counter examples to the D-N theory|
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