Tye-dyed teleology and the inverted spectrum

Philosophical Studies 156 (2):267-281 (2011)
Abstract
Michael Tye’s considered position on visual experience combines representationalism with externalism about color, so when considering spectrum inversion, he needs a principled reason to claim that a person with inverted color vision is seeing things incorrectly. Tye’s responses to the problem of the inverted spectrum ( 2000 , in: Consciousness, color, and content, The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA and 2002a , in: Chalmers (ed.) Philosophy of mind: classical and contemporary readings, Oxford University Press, Oxford) rely on a teleological approach to the evolution of vision to secure the grounds upon which people with normal color vision can be justly called ‘right’ and those with inverted color vision can be called ‘wrong’. I demonstrate that since the inverted spectrum thought experiment requires that both sorts of vision be behaviorally indistinguishable, no biologically acceptable concept of teleology will allow Tye to draw the distinction he needs
Keywords Tye  Representationalism  Inverted spectrum  Natural teleology  Evolution  Natural selection  Qualia  Color externalism
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References found in this work BETA
Francisco J. Ayala (1998). Teleological Explanations Versus Teleology. History and Philosophy of the Life Sciences 20 (1):41 - 50.
Alex Byrne (2007). Truest Blue. Analysis 67 (293):87-92.

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