Universals as sense-data

Abstract
This paper concerns the structure of appearances. I argue that to be appeared to in a certain way is to be aware of one or more universals. Universals therefore function like the sense-data, once highly favoured but now out of fashion. For instance, to be appeared to treely, in a visual way, is to be aware of the complex relation, being treeshaped and tree-coloured and being in front of, a relation of a kind which could be instantiated by a material object and a perceiver, which is thus instantiated in the veridical case but not in the non-veridical
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Citations of this work BETA
Matthew Kennedy (2009). Heirs of Nothing: The Implications of Transparency. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (3):574-604.
Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.
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Uriah Kriegel (2011). The Veil of Abstracta. Philosophical Issues 21 (1):245-267.
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Peter Forrest (2005). Universals as Sense-Data. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):622 - 631.
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