Willing Universal Law vs. Universally Lawful Willing

Southwest Philosophy Review 26 (1):141-152 (2010)
Kant's formula of universal law appears to fail in some cases, producing false negatives and false positives. Adding further qualifications to one's maxims can fix the first problem, but not all of the latter. In particular, there are maxims which generate no contradiction in will when practiced universally, but which are irrational to will that some agent follow in contexts where it is known that other agents are not following it. This reveals that Kant's conception of "universalization" is too narrow: we need to ask, not if we can will the universalization of a maxim's practice, but whether we can universally will, of each agent in every possible circumstance, that this agent follow the maxim.
Keywords Immanuel Kant  formula of universal law  deontic logic  moral universalization  contradiction in will
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DOI 10.5840/swphilreview201026116
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