The Immaterial Self: A Defense of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of Mind

Routledge (1991)
The Immaterial Self examines and defends this thesis, and in particular argues for its Cartesian version, which assigns the non-physical ingredients of the ...
Keywords Dualism  Epistemology  Functionalism  Identity  Immaterial  Mental  Metaphysics  Mind  Nihilism  Self
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ISBN(s) 0415029899   9780415029896
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William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Ian Phillips (2010). Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
Barry Dainton (2008). Sensing Change. Philosophical Issues 18 (1):362-384.

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