The Nature of Perception

New York: Oxford University Press (2000)
Abstract
John Foster addresses the question: what is it to perceive a physical object? He rejects the view that we perceive such objects directly, and argues for a new version of the traditional empiricist account, which locates the immediate objects of perception in the mind. But this account seems to imply that we do not perceive physical objects at all. Foster offers a surprising solution, which involves embracing an idealist view of the physical world.
Keywords Cognition  Epistemology  Idealism  Perception  Realism  Sense
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Call number B828.45.F67 2000
ISBN(s) 0199256624
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    Citations of this work BETA
    Elijah Chudnoff (2011). What Intuitions Are Like. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3):625-654.
    Kenneth Hobson (2013). In Defense of Relational Direct Realism. European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):550-574.

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