David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Princeton University Press (2000)
One of the world's most important philosophers of mind and language, John Searle (b. 1932) is direct, combative, and intellectually ambitious. His philosophy has made fundamental and lasting contributions to how we think about speech, consciousness, knowledge, truth, and the nature of social reality. Here, with remarkable clarity, a leading authority introduces students and generalists to those contributions. Nick Fotion explains Searle's ideas in full, while also testing and exploring their implications. He first takes up Searle's philosophy of language, examining how Searle treats speech acts and thinks about the metaphorical use of language. Next, the book sketches Searle's philosophy of mind, including his claims for intentionality and for the centrality of consciousness. This discussion highlights Searle's argument that the mind possesses a subjective character that materialist explanations (including behaviorism and strong artificial intelligence) cannot contain. The author goes on to look at Searle's later writings on the construction of social reality--work that mounts a sophisticated but plainly stated case against deconstructionist, skeptical, and relativistic accounts. Concluding with general reflections on Searle's position vis-à-vis ontology and epistemology, this book is the first to assess and identify common themes and approaches in the whole range of his extensive thought. In doing so, it presents Searle's extremely influential work for the first time as a coherent philosophy.
|Keywords||Searle, John R Philosophy of mind Language and languages|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$16.15 used (77% off) $38.98 new (43% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||B1649.S264.F68 2000|
|ISBN(s)||0691057117 9780691057125 0691057125 (paperback)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Vegard Fusche Moe (2007). Understanding the Background Conditions of Skilled Movement in Sport: A Study of Searle's 'Background Capacities'. Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 1 (3):299 – 324.
Jeffrey Hershfield (2005). Rule Following and the Background. Linguistics and Philosophy 28 (3):269 - 280.
Asa Kasher & Amos Yadlin (2005). Military Ethics of Fighting Terror: Response†. Journal of Military Ethics 4 (1):60-70.
Daniel D. Novotny (2007). Searle on the Unity of the World. Axiomathes 17 (1):41-51.
Vegard Fusche Moe (2005). A Philosophical Critique of Classical Cognitivism in Sport: From Information Processing to Bodily Background Knowledge. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 32 (2):155-183.
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