A gunk-friendly maxcon

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):611 – 627 (2008)
Hud Hudson has argued that if MaxCon, Ned Markosian's favoured answer to the Simple Question, is true, then there couldn't be gunky objects. If Hudson's argument succeeds, then those who believe that gunky objects are possible have a good reason to reject MaxCon. However, I show that Hudson's argument relies on substantive metaphysical claims that a proponent of MaxCon need not accept. Thus, one who endorses MaxCon need not reject the possibility of gunky objects and those who believe that gunky objects are possible need not reject MaxCon.
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DOI 10.1080/00048400802215463
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