Are dispositions reducible to categorical properties?

Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):62-64 (1986)
Abstract
Dispostions, such as solubility, cannont be reduced to categorical properties, such as molecular structure, without some element of dipositionaity remaining. Democritus did not reduce all properties to the geometry of atoms - he had to retain the rigidity of the atoms, that is, their disposition not to change shape when a force is applied. So dispositions-not-to, like rigidity, cannot be eliminated. Neither can dispositions-to, like solubility.
Keywords Dispositions
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DOI 10.2307/2219311
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George Molnar (1999). Are Dispositions Reducible? Philosophical Quarterly 50 (194):1-17.
Denny Bradshaw (2003). Dispositions and Ontology. Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):169-182.

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