David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Philosophy 66 (3):829-39 (1969)
This essay challenges the widely accepted principle that a person is morally responsible for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise. The author considers situations in which there are sufficient conditions for a certain choice or action to be performed by someone, So that it is impossible for the person to choose or to do otherwise, But in which these conditions do not in any way bring it about that the person chooses or acts as he does. In such situations the person may well be morally responsible for what he chooses or does despite his inability to choose or to do otherwise. Finally the author considers certain suggestions for revising the principle he rejects or for replacing it with a principle of an altogether different kind.
|Keywords||Ethics Free Will Moral Responsibility Possibility Frankfurt, H|
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Citations of this work BETA
Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (2007). Moral Responsibility and Determinism: The Cognitive Science of Folk Intuitions. Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
Adam Feltz & Edward T. Cokely (2009). Do Judgments About Freedom and Responsibility Depend on Who You Are? Personality Differences in Intuitions About Compatibilism and Incompatibilism. Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):342-350.
Matthias Steup (2012). Belief Control and Intentionality. Synthese 188 (2):145-163.
Oisín Deery, Taylor Davis & Jasmine Carey (2015). The Free-Will Intuitions Scale and the Question of Natural Compatibilism. Philosophical Psychology 28 (6):776-801.
D. DeGrazia (2014). Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and What We (Should) Value in Moral Behaviour. Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (6):361-368.
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