Graduate studies at Western
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):23-24 (1997)
|Abstract||This commentary connects some of Glenberg's ideas to similar ideas from artificial intelligence. Second, it briefly discusses hidden assumptions relating to meaning, representations, and projectable properties. Finally, questions about mechanisms, mental imagery, and conceptualization in animals are posed.|
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