Fetuses, corpses and the psychological approach to personal identity
Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):69-81 (2005)
| Abstract | Olson (1997a) tries to refute the Psychological Approach to personal identity with his Fetus Argument, and Mackie (1999) aims to do the same with the Death Argument. With the help of a suggestion made by Baker (1999), the following discussion shows that these arguments fail. In the process of defending the Psychological Approach, it is made clear exactly what one is and is not committed to as a proponent of the theory | |||||||||
| Keywords | Death Fetus Metaphysics Personal Identity Psychology | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesLynne Rudder Baker (1999). What Am I? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (1):151 - 159.
Eric T. Olson (1997). Was I Ever a Fetus? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57 (1):95-110.
Eric T. Olson (1997). The Human Animal: Personal Identity Without Psychology. Oxford University Press.
Anthony Brueckner (2009). Endurantism and the Psychological Approach to Personal Identity. Theoria 75 (1):28-33.
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