How we know our conscious minds: Introspective access to conscious thoughts

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (2):145-146 (2009)
Carruthers considers and rejects a mixed position according to which we have interpretative access to unconscious thoughts, but introspective access to conscious ones. I argue that this is too hasty. Given a two-level view of the mind, we can, and should, accept the mixed position, and we can do so without positing additional introspective mechanisms beyond those Carruthers already recognizes.
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DOI 10.1017/S0140525X09000636
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References found in this work BETA
Keith Frankish (2004). Mind and Supermind. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keith Frankish (1998). Natural Language and Virtual Belief. In Peter Carruthers & Jill Boucher (eds.), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary Themes. Cambridge University Press 248.

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