Inadvertence and Moral Responsibility

Ideas Y Valores 58 (141):11-24 (2009)
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Abstract

Against the view of certain philosophers, such as Thomas Nagel, I defend the common sense belief that people are not responsible for what they do or bring about inadvertently. I consider what response we might reasonably expect from a person who inadvertently does or brings about some event or condition that is manifestly undesirable or bad; and I suggest that we might reasonably expect such a person not to feel guilty but, rather, to feel embarrassed by his or her inability to prevent or avoid that condition or event.

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Harry G. Frankfurt
Princeton University

Citations of this work

Apology as Self-Repair.Marc A. Cohen - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (3):585-598.

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