Incompatibilism, nondeterministic causation, and the real problem of free will

I argue that there cannot be a sense attached to “could have done otherwise” that is both compatible with the truth of determinism and relevant to the question of free will. Then I develop an incompatibilist response to the common objection that the incompatibilist requires of free actions that they have no causes and therefore cannot be anything for which an agent can be responsible. In the process, I bring out a similarity between compatibilism and incompatibilism in respect of where their problem lies
Keywords Causation  Compatibilism  Determinism  Epistemology  Free Will
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DOI 10.5840/jpr_1993_12
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