David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2004)
Mind and Supermind offers a new perspective on the nature of belief and the structure of the human mind. Keith Frankish argues that the folk-psychological term 'belief' refers to two distinct types of mental state, which have different properties and support different kinds of mental explanation. Building on this claim, he develops a picture of the human mind as a two-level structure, consisting of a basic mind and a supermind, and shows how the resulting account sheds light on a number of puzzling phenomena and helps to vindicate folk psychology. Topics discussed include the function of conscious thought, the cognitive role of natural language, the relation between partial and flat-out belief, the possibility of active belief formation, and the nature of akrasia, self-deception, and first-person authority. This book will be valuable for philosophers, psychologists, and cognitive scientists.
|Keywords||Belief Folk Psychology Metaphysics Mind Modularity|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Buy the book||$14.25 used (88% off) $30.96 new (73% off) $58.55 direct from Amazon (6% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BD418.3.F73 2004|
|ISBN(s)||9780521812030 0521038111 0521812038|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Carruthers (2007). The Illusion of Conscious Will. Synthese 96 (2):197 - 213.
Peter Carruthers (2010). Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.
Peter Carruthers (2007). Meta-Cognition in Animals: A Skeptical Look. Mind and Language 22 (1):58–89.
Joshua Shepherd (2013). The Apparent Illusion of Conscious Deciding. Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):18 - 30.
Eric Schwitzgebel (2010). Acting Contrary to Our Professed Beliefs or the Gulf Between Occurrent Judgment and Dispositional Belief. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.
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