Mere Cambridge Properties

American Philosophical Quarterly 36 (4):295-308 (1999)
Abstract
The predicates 'is outgrown by Theaetetus,' 'is 300 miles west of a lemur,' and 'is such that 9 is odd' denote properties, but there is a sense in which these properties are not genuine features of the objects that have them. The fact that we find these mere-Cambridge properties odd has something to do with their relational character. But relationality in itself is not an adequate criterion for property-genuineness for there are many relational properties that do not qualify as mere-Cambridge. The goal of this essay is to isolate the special type of relationality needed to explain what makes a property genuine. In the process, the author evaluates causal accounts of property-genuineness, and shows how the analysis presented is superior.
Keywords properties  change  intrinsic  extrinsic
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