No Deep Disagreement for New Relativists

Philosophical Studies 151 (1):19--37 (2010)
Abstract
Recently a number of writers have argued that a new form of relativism involves a form of semantic context-dependence which helps it escape the perhaps most common objection to ordinary contextualism; that it cannot accommodate our intuitions about disagreement. I argue: (i) In order to evaluate this claim we have to pay closer attention to the nature of our intuitions about disagreement. (ii) We have different such intuitions concerning different questions: we have more stable disagreement intuitions about moral disputes than about, say, disputes about matters of taste. (iii) The new form of relativism does not vindicate the stable intuitions about disagreement. (iv) It does a better job explaining the unstable intuitions than contextualism. But, pace some relativists, it is not clear that assertion-truth rather than just proposition-truth has to be relativized to accomplish this.
Keywords philpapers: relativism about truth
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    References found in this work BETA
    Lars Binderup (2008). Brogaard's Moral Contextualism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):410–415.
    Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
    R. A. Duff & David B. Wong (1986). Moral Relativity. Philosophical Quarterly 36 (142):99.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Teresa Marques (2014). Relative Correctness. Philosophical Studies 167 (2):361-373.
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