Non-deductive logic in mathematics
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):1-18 (1987)
| Abstract | Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as Fermat's Last Theorem and the Riemann Hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. It is argued here that it is not adequate to describe the relation of evidence to hypothesis as `subjective', `heuristic' or `pragmatic', but that there must be an element of what it is rational to believe on the evidence, that is, of non-deductive logic. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesJay Zeman (1986). Peirce's Philosophy of Logic. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 22 (1):1 - 22.
Matthew McKeon, Logical Consequence, Deductive-Theoretic Conceptions. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
James Franklin (1996). Proof in Mathematics. Quakers Hill Press.
Tyler Burge (2003). Logic and Analyticity. Grazer Philosophische Studien 66 (1):199-249.
Stewart Shapiro (2009). We Hold These Truths to Be Self-Evident: But What Do We Mean by That? Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1):175-207.
Michael Otte (2006). Proof-Analysis and Continuity. Foundations of Science 11 (1-2).
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads42 ( #27,062 of 549,124 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,124 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
