British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1):1-18 (1987)
|Abstract||Mathematicians often speak of conjectures as being confirmed by evidence that falls short of proof. For their own conjectures, evidence justifies further work in looking for a proof. Those conjectures of mathematics that have long resisted proof, such as Fermat's Last Theorem and the Riemann Hypothesis, have had to be considered in terms of the evidence for and against them. It is argued here that it is not adequate to describe the relation of evidence to hypothesis as `subjective', `heuristic' or `pragmatic', but that there must be an element of what it is rational to believe on the evidence, that is, of non-deductive logic.|
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