On explanation in cognitive science: Competence, idealization, and the failure of the classical cascade
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (4):475-502 (1995)
|Abstract||underpinning of the cognitive sciences. I argue, however, that it often fails to provide adequate explanations, in particular in conjunction with competence theories. This failure originates in the idealizations in competence descriptions, which either ?block? the cascade, or produce a successful cascade which fails to explain cognition|
|Keywords||Classical Cognitive Science Methodology Realism Science|
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