Propositional attitudes in weak pragmatics

Studia Logica 38 (4):365 - 374 (1979)
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Abstract

Sentences attributing beliefs, doubts, wants, and the like (propositional attitudes, in Russell's terminology) have posed a major problem for semantics. Recently the pragmatic description of language has become more systematic. I shall discuss the formalization of pragmatics, and propose an analysis of belief attribution that avoids some main problems apparently inherent in the semantic approach.

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Bas C. Van Fraassen
San Francisco State University

Citations of this work

Dthis and dthat: Indexicality goes beyond that.Joseph Almog - 1981 - Philosophical Studies 39 (4):347 - 381.
Van Fraassen on propositional attitudes.J. Paul Reddam - 1982 - Philosophical Studies 42 (1):101 - 110.

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References found in this work

The only necessity is verbal necessity.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1977 - Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):71-85.

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