Propositional attitudes in weak pragmatics
Studia Logica 38 (4):365 - 374 (1979)
| Abstract | Sentences attributing beliefs, doubts, wants, and the like (propositional attitudes, in Russell's terminology) have posed a major problem for semantics. Recently the pragmatic description of language has become more systematic. I shall discuss the formalization of pragmatics, and propose an analysis of belief attribution that avoids some main problems apparently inherent in the semantic approach. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,701 |
| External links |
 |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesAsbjørn Steglich-Petersen (2008). Against Essential Normativity of the Mental. Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
John Zeimbekis (2004). Propositional Attitudes in Fiction. British Journal of Aesthetics 44 (3):261-276.
Franz Dietrich Christian List, The Aggregation of Propositional Attitudes: Towards a General Theory.
Sørenarnow H. Klausen (2008). The Phenomenology of Propositional Attitudes. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4).
Peter Ludlow (2000). Interpreted Logical Forms, Belief Attribution, and the Dynamic Lexicon. In K. Jaczszolt (ed.), The Pragmatics of Propositional Attitudes. Elsevier.
Alex Grzankowski (forthcoming). Attitudes Without Propositions. European Journal of Philosophy.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-01-28Total downloads12 ( #93,408 of 549,106 )Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #63,361 of 549,106 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
