Psychological Continuity and the Necessity of Identity
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):337-350 (2010)
In attempting to understand personal identity, it is common practice to imagine a person existing at some time t and a person existing at a time t* , and then to ask, What does it take for person x at t to be the same person as person y at t*?The Psychological Continuity Approach answers: there is a relation, R, of psychological continuity such that person x at t is the same person as person y at t* if and only if x at t bears R to y at t*.But maybe the question above is not the right one to ask when trying to understand personal identity. Olson calls this the narrow question of personal identity, which he distinguishes from the broad question: What does it take for person x at t to be the same individual as y at t*?
|Keywords||personal identity psychological continuity necessity of identity|
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