Psychological Continuity, Fission, and the Non-Branching Constraint

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):21-31 (2008)
Abstract
Abstract: Those who endorse the Psychological Continuity Approach (PCA) to analyzing personal identity need to impose a non-branching constraint to get the intuitively correct result that in the case of fission, one person becomes two. With the help of Brueckner's (2005) discussion, it is shown here that the sort of non-branching clause that allows proponents of PCA to provide sufficient conditions for being the same person actually runs contrary to the very spirit of their theory. The problem is first presented in connection with perdurantist versions of PCA. The difficulty is then shown to apply to endurantist versions as well.
Keywords personal identity  psychological continuity  fission  non-branching
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