Philosophical Papers 30 (2):93-116 (2001)
|Abstract||Abstract Substance dualism is widely rejected by philosophers of mind, but many continue to accept some form of property dualism. The assumption here is that one can consistently believe that (1) mental properties are not physical properties, while denying that (2) mental particulars are not physical particulars. But is this assumption true? This paper considers several analyses of what makes something a physical particular (as opposed to a non-physical particular), and it is argued that on any plausible analysis, accepting (1) requires accepting (2) as well|
|Keywords||Dualism Mental Metaphysics Property Substance|
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