David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In Jennifer Lackey & David Christensen (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. OUP 121-166 (2013)
If you retain your belief upon learning that a large number and percentage of your recognized epistemic superiors disagree with you, then what happens to the epistemic status of your belief? I investigate that theoretical question as well has the applied case of philosophical disagreement—especially disagreement regarding purely philosophical error theories, theories that do not have much empirical support and that reject large swaths of our most commonsensical beliefs. I argue that even if all those error theories are false, either (a) the average philosopher’s true commonsensical beliefs are epistemically impoverished, or (b) a good portion of philosophy is bunk and philosophers should give up most of their error theories despite the fact that their supporting arguments are generally as good as or even better than other philosophical arguments.
|Keywords||disagreement skepticism evidence metaphilosophy|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Similar books and articles
Andrew Rotondo (2013). Undermining, Circularity, and Disagreement. Synthese 190 (3):563-584.
Bryan Frances (2012). Discovering Disagreeing Epistemic Peers and Superiors. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):1 - 21.
Brandon Carey (2011). Possible Disagreements and Defeat. Philosophical Studies 155 (3):371-381.
Brian Ribeiro (2011). Philosophy and Disagreement. Critica 43 (127):3-25.
Chris Daly & David Liggins (2010). In Defence of Error Theory. Philosophical Studies 149 (2):209-230.
David Christensen (2011). Disagreement, Question-Begging, and Epistemic Self-Criticism. Philosophers' Imprint 11 (6).
Michael Thune (2010). Religious Belief and the Epistemology of Disagreement. Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.
Jason Brennan (2010). Scepticism About Philosophy. Ratio 23 (1):1-16.
Richard Feldman (2009). Evidentialism, Higher-Order Evidence, and Disagreement. Episteme 6 (3):294-312.
Bryan Frances (2010). The Reflective Epistemic Renegade. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):419 - 463.
Added to index2009-04-23
Total downloads331 ( #5,864 of 1,796,448 )
Recent downloads (6 months)31 ( #25,522 of 1,796,448 )
How can I increase my downloads?