David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):369-390 (1992)
This paper discusses some requirements on a folk-psychological, computational account of concepts. Although most psychological views take the folk-psychological stance that concept-possession requires capacities of both representation and classification, such views lack a philosophical context. In contrast, philosophically motivated views stress one of these capacities at the expense of the other. This paper seeks to provide some philosophical motivation for the (folk-) psychological stance. Philosophical and psychological constraints on a computational level account provide the context for evaluating two theses. The first, the Classificatory View, is that concept-possession is constituted by the ability to classify states of the world. I argue, against this view, that to be able to classify, a thinker must also be able to represent the world. The second thesis, the Representational View, is that to possess a concept is constituted by the ability to represent the world. I argue that ascribing this ability is incoherent without ascribing an ability to classify. Hence, a detailed computational specification of concept-possession suggests that the folk-psychological stance is accurate. Philosophical views of concepts, (e.g. Fodor, 1987), adhering to one of the strong theses, whilst adverting to folk-psychological motivations, are thus both insufficiently complex and incoherent
|Keywords||Ascription Concept Folk Psychology Metaphysics Realism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
W. V. Quine (1960). Word and Object. The MIT Press.
David Marr (1982). Vision. Freeman.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Jerry A. Fodor (1987). Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind. MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Nick Braisby, Bradley Franks & James Hampton (1996). Essentialism, Word Use, and Concepts. Cognition 59 (3):247-274.
Bradley Franks (1995). Sense Generation: A “Quasi‐Classical” Approach to Concepts and Concept Combination. Cognitive Science 19 (4):441-505.
Similar books and articles
Tamás Demeter (2009). Folk Psychology Is Not a Metarepresentational Device. European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 5 (2):19-38.
George Graham & Terence E. Horgan (1988). How to Be Realistic About Folk Psychology. Philosophical Psychology 1 (1):69-81.
Kristin Andrews (2007). Critter Psychology: On the Possibility of Nonhuman Animal Folk Psychology. In Daniel D. Hutto & Matthew Ratcliffe (eds.), Folk Psychology Re-Assessed. Kluwer/Springer Press 191--209.
G. Fletcher (1995). Two Uses of Folk Psychology: Implications for Psychological Science. Philosophical Psychology 8 (3):375-88.
George Graham (1987). The Origins of Folk Psychology. Inquiry 30 (December):357-79.
Alvin Goldman (1993). Consciousness, Folk Psychology, and Cognitive Science. Consciousness and Cognition 2 (4):364-382.
Karsten R. Stueber (2009). The Ethical Dimension of Folk Psychology? Inquiry 52 (5):532-547.
Stephen Mills (2001). The Idea of Different Folk Psychologies. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 9 (4):501 – 519.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads13 ( #223,423 of 1,781,359 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #295,021 of 1,781,359 )
How can I increase my downloads?