The anti-zombie argument

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666 (2007)
Abstract In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers no independent reason to reject physicalism.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,672
External links
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  •   Try with proxy.
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles
    Tim Crane (2005). Papineau on Phenomenal Concepts. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):155-162.
    David Robb (2008). Zombies From Below. In Simone Gozzano Francesco Orilia (ed.), Tropes, Universals, and the Philosophy of Mind: Essays at the Boundary of Ontology and Philosophical Psychology. Ontos Verlag.
    David J. Chalmers (2004). Imagination, Indexicality, and Intensions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):182-90.

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    107 ( #5,312 of 549,037 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    9 ( #7,681 of 549,037 )

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums