The anti-zombie argument

Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):650–666 (2007)
Abstract
In recent years the 'zombie argument' has come to occupy a central role in the case against physicalist views of consciousness, in large part because of the powerful advocacy it has received from David Chalmers.1 In this paper I seek to neutralize it by showing that a parallel argument can be run for physicalism, an argument turning on the conceivability of what I shall call anti-zombies. I shall argue that the result is a stand-off, and that the zombie argument offers no independent reason to reject physicalism.
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    References found in this work BETA
    David J. Chalmers (1999). Materialism and the Metaphysics of Modality. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):473-96.
    Stephen Yablo (1999). Concepts and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455-463.
    Stephen Yablo (1999). Review: Concepts and Consciousness. [REVIEW] Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (2):455 - 463.
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