The Argument from Disagreement and the Role of Cross-Cultural Empirical Data

Mind and Language 25 (5):541-560 (2010)
Abstract
The Argument from Disagreement (AD) (Mackie, 1977) depends upon empirical evidence for ‘fundamental’ moral disagreement (FMD) (Doris and Stich, 2005; Doris and Plakias, 2008). Research on the Southern ‘culture of honour’ (Nisbett and Cohen, 1996) has been presented as evidence for FMD between Northerners and Southerners within the US. We raise some doubts about the usefulness of such data in settling AD. We offer an alternative based on recent work in moral psychology that targets the potential universality of morally significant distinctions (e.g. means vs. side-effects, actions versus omissions). More specifically, we argue that a recent study showing that a rural Mayan population fails to perceive as morally significant the distinction between actions and omissions provides a plausible case of FMD between Mayans and Westerners
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 10,986
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Berit Brogaard (2008). Moral Contextualism and Moral Relativism. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (232):385 - 409.
David E. Cooper (1978). Moral Relativism. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 3 (1):97-108.

View all 23 references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Similar books and articles
Thomas Nadelhoffer (2004). On Praise, Side Effects, and Folk Ascriptions of Intentionality. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 24 (2):196-213.
Diego E. Machuca (2011). The Pyrrhonian Argument From Possible Disagreement. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 93 (2):148-161.
John K. Davis (2010). An Alternative to Relativism. Philosophical Topics 38 (2):17-37.
Analytics

Monthly downloads

Added to index

2010-10-19

Total downloads

88 ( #13,892 of 1,100,994 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #34,406 of 1,100,994 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Start a new thread
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.