The nonreductionist's troubles with supervenience

Philosophical Studies 89 (1):105-24 (1998)
I argue that there is a tension between three popular views in the philosophy of mind: (1) mental properties are not identical with physical properties (a version of nonreductionism), but (2) mental properties are had solely by virtue of physical properties (physicalism regarding the mind), which requires that (3) mental properties supervene on physical properties. To earn the title "physicalist," one must hold a sufficiently strong version of the supervenience thesis. But this, I argue, will be a version that undermines nonreductionism.
Keywords reductionism  supervenience  physicalism  nonreductive physicalism
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004273009713
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