The Reflective Epistemic Renegade

Abstract
Philosophers often find themselves in disagreement with contemporary philosophers they know full well to be their epistemic superiors on the topics relevant to the disagreement. This looks epistemically irresponsible. I offer a detailed investigation of this problem of the reflective epistemic renegade. I argue that although in some cases the renegade is not epistemically blameworthy, and the renegade situation is significantly less common than most would think, in a troublesome number of cases in which the situation arises the renegade is blameworthy in her disagreement with recognized epistemic superiors. I also offer some thoughts on what it would mean for philosophical practice for us to refrain from being renegades. Finally, I show how a new kind of radical skepticism emerges from modest theses regarding the renegade
Keywords disagreement  metaphilosophy
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    References found in this work BETA
    Richard Feldman (2006). Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement. In Stephen Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology Futures. Oxford University Press. 216-236.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    David Christensen (2010). Higher-Order Evidence. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185-215.
    Graham Oppy (2010). Disagreement. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 68 (1):183-199.

    View all 7 citations

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