David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophy of Science 66 (S1):S379 - S389 (1999)
Bayesian psychology, in what is perhaps its most familiar version, is incomplete: Jeffrey conditionalization is not a complete account of rational belief change. Jeffrey conditionalization is sensitive to the order in which the evidence arrives. This order effect can be so pronounced as to call for a belief adjustment that cannot be understood as an assimilation of incoming evidence by Jeffrey's rule. Hartry Field's reparameterization of Jeffrey's rule avoids the order effect but fails as an account of how new evidence should be assimilated
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Frank Döring (1999). Why Bayesian Psychology is Incomplete. Philosophy of Science 66 (3):389.
Giovanni Facchini, Freek van Megen, Peter Borm & Stef Tijs (1997). Congestion Models and Weighted Bayesian Potential Games. Theory and Decision 42 (2):193-206.
Mark Kaplan (1989). Bayesianism Without the Black Box. Philosophy of Science 56 (1):48-69.
Andrew Wayne (1995). Bayesianism and Diverse Evidence. Philosophy of Science 62 (1):111-121.
Patrick Maher (2010). Bayesian Probability. Synthese 172 (1):119 - 127.
Cory Juhl (1993). Bayesianism and Reliable Scientific Inquiry. Philosophy of Science 60 (2):302-319.
Jim Hopkins (2012). Psychoanalysis Representation and Neuroscience: The Freudian Unconscious and the Bayesian Brain. In A. Fotopoulu, D. Pfaff & M. Conway (eds.), From the Couch to the Lab: Psychoanalysis, Neuroscience and Cognitive Psychology in Dialoge. OUP
M. Colombo & P. Series (2012). Bayes in the Brain--On Bayesian Modelling in Neuroscience. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):697-723.
Jan Sprenger (2013). The Role of Bayesian Philosophy Within Bayesian Model Selection. European Journal for Philosophy of Science 3 (1):101-114.
Francis Colas, Julien Diard & Pierre Bessière (2010). Common Bayesian Models for Common Cognitive Issues. Acta Biotheoretica 58 (2):191-216.
Daniel Steel (2007). Bayesian Confirmation Theory and the Likelihood Principle. Synthese 156 (1):53 - 77.
Persi Diaconis & Susan Holmes (1996). Are There Still Things to Do in Bayesian Statistics? Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):145 - 158.
Added to index2010-08-24
Total downloads19 ( #206,457 of 1,934,517 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #113,162 of 1,934,517 )
How can I increase my downloads?