What is the point? Concepts, description, and rigid designation
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):70-70 (1998)
| Abstract | Millikan's nondescriptionist approach applies an account of meaning to concepts in terms of designation. The essentialism that provides the principal grounds for rigid designation, however, receives no empirical support from concepts. Whatever the grounding, this view not only faces the problems of rigid designation in theories of meaning, it also calls for a role for pragmatics more consonant with descriptionist theories of concepts. | |||||||||
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