What multiple realizability does not show
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28 (1997)
It is widely held that psychological theories cannot be reduced to those of the natural sciences. Perhaps the most common reason for rejecting psycho-physical reduction is the belief that mental properties are multiply realizable--i.e., that events of different physical types might realize the same mental property. While the multiple realizability argument has had its share of criticism, its major flaw has been overlooked. I aim to show the real reason why the argument fails and why multiple realizability is compatible with even the strongest varieties of reduction.
|Keywords||Natural Sciences Psychology Realization Reduction Science|
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