L'intentionnalité et le caractère qualitatif des vécus.Husserl, Brentano et Lotze

Studia Phaenomenologica 10 (1):91-117 (2010)
Abstract
Lotze’s influence on the development of the XIXth and XXth century philosophy and psychology remains largely neglected still today. In this paper, I examine some Lotzean elements in Husserl’s early conception of intentionality, and more specifically in his rejection of the Brentanian concept of intentionality. I argue that Husserl and Lotze, pace Brentano, share a qualitative conception of experiences, what they both call the Zumutesein of experiences. Furthermore, I discuss other issues upon which Husserl and Lotze share common intuitions: the perception of space, the theory of local signs, the realisations of thinking (Leistungen des Denkens) and phenomenology
Keywords Lotze  Husserl  Brentano  intentionality  phenomenal experience  perception
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