David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Minds and Machines 18 (3):379-401 (2008)
This paper deals with the question: What are the criteria that an adequate theory of computation has to meet? 1. Smith's answer: it has to meet the empirical criterion (i.e. doing justice to computational practice), the conceptual criterion (i.e. explaining all the underlying concepts) and the cognitive criterion (i.e. providing solid grounds for computationalism). 2. Piccinini's answer: it has to meet the objectivity criterion (i.e. identifying computation as a matter of fact), the explanation criterion (i.e. explaining the computer's behaviour), the right things compute criterion, the miscomputation criterion (i.e. accounting for malfunctions), the taxonomy criterion (i.e. distinguishing between different classes of computers) and the empirical criterion. 3. Von Neumann's answer: it has to meet the precision and reliability of computers criterion, the single error criterion (i.e. addressing the impacts of errors) and the distinction between analogue and digital computers criterion. 4. “Everything” computes answer: it has to meet the implementation theory criterion by properly explaining the notion of implementation. According to computationalists, minds are computational. Before we can judge the plausibility of any particular computationalist theory, we need to understand what notion of computation this theory employs. Although there are extant accounts of computation, any of which may, in principle, serve as a basis for computationalism, it isn’t clear that they’re all equivalent or even adequate as accounts of computation proper. By examining plausible alternatives to Smith’s adequacy criteria, our goal here is to resist his claim that no adequate account of computation proper is possible.
|Keywords||Cognition Computation Computationalism Computers Implementation Practice Subject Matter Theory Turing machines|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1975). The Language of Thought. Harvard University Press.
Karl R. Popper (1961). The Poverty of Historicism. London, Routledge & Paul.
Citations of this work BETA
Nir Fresco (2010). Explaining Computation Without Semantics: Keeping It Simple. [REVIEW] Minds and Machines 20 (2):165-181.
Nir Fresco (2013). Information Processing as an Account of Concrete Digital Computation. Philosophy and Technology 26 (1):31-60.
Nir Fresco (2011). Concrete Digital Computation: What Does It Take for a Physical System to Compute? [REVIEW] Journal of Logic, Language and Information 20 (4):513-537.
Similar books and articles
G. H. Merrill (1979). Confirmation and Prediction. Philosophy of Science 46 (1):98-117.
B. C. Postow (1989). The FPL Model and Practical Inference. Philosophy of Science 56 (1):165-170.
Xiaoqiang Han (2009). The Criterion or Criteria of Change. Metaphysica 10 (2):149-156.
Michael Baumgartner & Timm Lampert (2008). Adequate Formalization. Synthese 164 (1):93-115.
Eike-Henner W. Kluge (1984). Cerebral Death. Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 5 (2).
Peter Hinst (1983). Quines Ontologiekriterium. Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):193 - 215.
Mark Owen Webb (2009). An Eliminativist Theory of Religion. Sophia 48 (1):35-42.
Thomas Pradeu & Edgardo D. Carosella (2006). On the Definition of a Criterion of Immunogenicity. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 103 (47):17858--17861.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #96,092 of 1,796,251 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #137,388 of 1,796,251 )
How can I increase my downloads?