David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Artificial Intelligence and Law 4 (3-4):163-197 (1996)
We present a computational model of dialectical argumentation that could serve as a basis for legal reasoning. The legal domain is an instance of a domain in which knowledge is incomplete, uncertain, and inconsistent. Argumentation is well suited for reasoning in such weak theory domains. We model argument both as information structure, i.e., argument units connecting claims with supporting data, and as dialectical process, i.e., an alternating series of moves by opposing sides. Our model includes burden of proof as a key element, indicating what level of support must be achieved by one side to win the argument. Burden of proof acts as move filter, turntaking mechanism, and termination criterion, eventually determining the winner of an argument. Our model has been implemented in a computer program. We demonstrate the model by considering program output for two examples previously discussed in the artificial intelligence and legal reasoning literature.
|Keywords||argumentation legal reasoning burden of proof|
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References found in this work BETA
Stephen E. Toulmin (2003). The Uses of Argument. Monograph Collection (Matt - Pseudo).
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John Pollock (1987). Defeasible Reasoning. Cognitive Science 11 (4):481-518.
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Citations of this work BETA
Trevor Bench-Capon, Michał Araszkiewicz, Kevin Ashley, Katie Atkinson, Floris Bex, Filipe Borges, Daniele Bourcier, Paul Bourgine, Jack G. Conrad, Enrico Francesconi, Thomas F. Gordon, Guido Governatori, Jochen L. Leidner, David D. Lewis, Ronald P. Loui, L. Thorne McCarty, Henry Prakken, Frank Schilder, Erich Schweighofer, Paul Thompson, Alex Tyrrell, Bart Verheij, Douglas N. Walton & Adam Z. Wyner (2012). A History of AI and Law in 50 Papers: 25 Years of the International Conference on AI and Law. [REVIEW] Artificial Intelligence and Law 20 (3):215-319.
Ephraim Nissan (forthcoming). Digital Technologies and Artificial Intelligence’s Present and Foreseeable Impact on Lawyering, Judging, Policing and Law Enforcement. AI and Society.
Jaap Hage (2004). Comparing Alternatives in the Law. Artificial Intelligence and Law 12 (3):181-225.
Douglas Walton & Giovanni Sartor (2013). Teleological Justification of Argumentation Schemes. Argumentation 27 (2):111-142.
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