A puzzle about natural laws and the existence of God

Abstract
The existence of natural laws, whether deterministic or indeterministic, and whether exceptionless or ceteris paribus, seems puzzling because it implies that mindless bits of matter behave in a consistent and co-ordinated way. I explain this puzzle by showing that a number of attempted solutions fail. The puzzle could be resolved if it were assumed that natural laws are a manifestation of God’s activity. This argument from natural law to God’s existence differs from its traditional counterparts in that, whereas the latter seek to explain the fact of natural laws, the former seeks to explain their possibility. The customary objections to the traditional arguments cannot be successfully adapted to counter this new argument, with one exception which has only limited effect. I rebut four claims that the theistic solution to the puzzle about natural laws is paradoxical, though I concede that one of these claims has merit. I consider four objections to the new argument but find three of them more or less unsatisfactory. The fourth, if successful, would undermine our claims to know the truth about the world
Keywords Ceteris paribus  Chance  Commands  God  Natural laws  Necessity  Possibility  Science
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References found in this work BETA
John W. Carroll, Laws of Nature. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Danny Frederick (2010). Popper and Free Will. Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
Danny Frederick (2010). Unmotivated Intentional Action. Philosophical Frontiers 5 (1):21-30.
Jennifer Hornsby (1980). Actions. Routledge and Kegan Paul.

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