Critique of an Argument for the Reality of Purpose

Prolegomena 11 (1):25-34 (2012)
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Abstract

Schueler has argued, against the eliminativist, that human purposive action cannot be an illusion because the concept of purpose is not theoretical. He argues that the concept is known directly to be instantiated, through self-awareness; and that to maintain that the concept is theoretical involves an infinite regress. I show that Schueler’s argument fails because all our concepts are theoretical in the sense that we may be mistaken in applying them to our experience. As a consequence, it is conceivable that direct introspection of an event as a purposive action may be mistaken. I indicate ways in which the eliminativist may be able to explain why our perception and introspection is afflicted with systematic error.

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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.

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