Disquotationalism, truth and justification: The pragmatist's wrong turn

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):371-386 (2006)
I argue that Cheryl Misak, in her Deflating Truth: Pragmatism vs. Minimalism, puts forth a pragmatist theory of truth that is deflationary in spirit but goes beyond the triviality of the equivalence schema. Furthermore, Misak's criticism of disquotationalism is systemic of a larger problem with her pragmatist theory of truth, namely her desire to explicate justification in terms of truth. She is right that people's assorteric practices involve defending their beliefs to one another, but she is wrong to think that people have to reinflate truth to make sense of this.
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