Doxastic Voluntarism: A Sceptical Defence

Abstract
Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus to choose to believe. I show that the arguments that have been offered against doxastic voluntarism fail; and that, if the denial of doxastic voluntarism is part of a strategy to defeat scepticism, it is inept, because knowledge presupposes doubt.
Keywords Alston  belief  doubt  doxastic voluntarism  knowledge  scepticism  Williams  Hieronymi  Popper  agnosticism
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