David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (1):24-44 (2013)
Doxastic voluntarism maintains that we have voluntary control over our beliefs. It is generally denied by contemporary philosophers. I argue that doxastic voluntarism is true: normally, and insofar as we are rational, we are able to suspend belief and, provided we have a natural inclination to believe, we are able to rescind that suspension, and thus to choose to believe. I show that the arguments that have been offered against doxastic voluntarism fail; and that, if the denial of doxastic voluntarism is part of a strategy to defeat scepticism, it is inept, because knowledge presupposes doubt.
|Keywords||Alston belief doubt doxastic voluntarism knowledge scepticism Williams Hieronymi Popper agnosticism|
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