I. Addis on analysing disposition concepts

Inquiry 28 (1-4):247-260 (1985)
Addis (1981) has criticized a proposal of ours (Wilson [1969b]) for analysing disposition predications in terns of the horseshoe of material implication, and has proposed a related but significantly different analysis. This paper restates the original proposal, and defends it against Addis's criticisms. It is further argued that his proposal will not do as a general account of disposition predications; that, however, if it is suitably qualified, then it does account for certain special sorts of disposition predication; but that so understood, it can be seen to be but a special case of ours
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DOI 10.1080/00201748508602066
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References found in this work BETA
Rudolf Carnap (1936). Testability and Meaning. Philosophy of Science 3 (4):419-471.
Donald Davidson (1967). Causal Relations. Journal of Philosophy 64 (21):691-703.

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Citations of this work BETA
Laird Addis (1988). Dispositional Mental States: Chomsky and Freud. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 19 (1):1-17.

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