Review: Keller, Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness

Journal of the History of Philosophy 38 (2):285-287 (2000)
Keller (Univ. of California, Riverside) offers an original reading of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason that combines thematic focus and comprehensive scope." Choice \n\nBook Description\n\nIn Kant and the Demands of Self-Consciousness, Pierre Keller examines\nKant's theory of self-consciousness and argues that it succeeds in\nexplaining how both subjective and objective experience are possible.\nPrevious interpretations of Kant's theory have held that he treats\nall self-consciousness as knowledge of objective states of affairs,\nand also that self-consciousness can be interpreted as knowledge\nof personal identity. By developing this striking new interpretation\nKeller is able to argue that transcendental self-consciousness underwrites\na general theory of objectivity and subjectivity at the same time.\n
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2005.0080
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