Laudan's naturalistic axiology
Philosophy of Science 66 (3):537 (1999)
| Abstract | Doppelt (1986,1990), Siegel (1990), and Rosenberg (1996) argue that the pivotal feature of Laudan's normative naturalism, namely his axiology, lacks a naturalistic foundation. In this paper I show that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of Laudan's use of the term 'naturalism'. Specifically, I argue that there are two important senses of naturalism running through Laudan's work. Once these two strands are made explicit, the objection raised by Doppelt and others simply disappears | |||||||||
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Harvey Siegel (1996). Instrumental Rationality and Naturalized Philosophy of Science. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):124.
Henry J. Folse (1990). Laudan's Model of Axiological Change and the Bohr-Einstein Debate. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:77 - 88.
Larry Laudan (1990). Normative Naturalism. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):44-59.
Howard Sankey (1996). Normative Naturalism and the Challenge of Relativism: Laudan Versus Worrall on the Justification of Methodological Principles. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 10 (1):37 – 51.
Dan McArthur (2007). Laudan, Friedman and the Role of the A Priori in Science. Journal of Philosophical Research 32:169-190.
Philip L. Quinn (1986). Comments on Laudan's "Methodology: Its Prospects". PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986:355 - 358.
Warren Schmaus (1996). The Empirical Character of Methodological Rules. Philosophy of Science 63 (3):106.
Jonathan Knowles (2002). What's Really Wrong with Laudan's Normative Naturalism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 16 (2):171 – 186.
Dan McArthur (2005). Normative Naturalism and the Relativised a Priori. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 36 (2):331 - 350.
Karyn L. Freedman (2006). Normative Naturalism and Epistemic Relativism. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 20 (3):309 – 322.
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