Moral inquiry and the pragmatic basis of objectivity
Southern Journal of Philosophy (forthcoming)
| Abstract | This article defends a pragmatic conception of objectivity for the moral domain. I begin contextualizing pragmatic approaches to objectivity and discuss at some length one of the most interesting proposals in this area, Cheryl Misak’s conception of pragmatic objectivity. My general argument is that in order to defend a pragmatic approach to objectivity the pragmatic stance should be interpreted in more radical terms than most contemporary proposals do. I propose notably to disentangle the connection between objectivity and truth, claiming that moral inquiry is in most of the cases responsive to a discursive norm that is closer to warranted assertibility than to truth. Using an argument that relies partly on Huw Price's account of forms of normative assertion, I will show that a practice-based account of warranted assertibility does the epistemic work required to defend objectivity while not being exposed to the criticisms that are usually addressed against this notion. The first section sets the general argument within its pragmatic context. The second section outlines Misak's conception of pragmatic objectivity, and highlights the sense in which she makes moral objectivity depend upon truth. The third and the fourth sections provide two critical arguments against Misak's thesis. Finally, with the critical work done, in the last section I present my constructive account of pragmatic objectivity for the moral domain. | |||||||||
| Keywords | pragmatic objectivity pragmatism warranted assertibility john dewey cheryl misak | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,875 |
| External links | This entry has no external links. Add one. |
| Through your library | Configure |
Similar books and articlesRoberto Frega (2013). Rehabilitating Warranted Assertibility: Moral Inquiry and the Pragmatic Basis of Objectivity. Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):1-23.
Steven Levine (2010). Rehabilitating Objectivity: Rorty, Brandom, and the New Pragmatism. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (4):567-589.
David L. Hildebrand (2011). Pragmatic Democracy: Inquiry, Objectivity, and Experience. Metaphilosophy 42 (5):589-604.
C. J. Misak (2004). Truth and the End of Inquiry: A Peircean Account of Truth. Oxford University Press.
Jennifer Tannoch-Bland (1997). From Aperspectival Objectivity to Strong Objectivity: The Quest for Moral Objectivity. Hypatia 12 (1):155 - 178.
Brian Leiter (ed.) (2001). Objectivity in Law and Morals. Cambridge University Press.
Steven Ross (2001). Two Problems of Moral Objectivity. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-62.
Roberto Frega (2012). Practice, Judgment, and the Challenge of Moral and Political Disagreement: A Pragmatist Account. Lexington Books.
Stephen Gaukroger (2012). Objectivity: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press.
Cheryl Misak (1992). Truth and Objectivity. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):365-379.
Robert Albin (2012). BEYOND MODES OF OBJECTIVITY. Logos and Episteme (3):361-371.
William Rehg (1999). Intractable Conflicts and Moral Objectivity: A Dialogical, Problem-Based Approach. Inquiry 42 (2):229 – 257.
Lorraine Daston (2007). Objectivity. Distributed by the Mit Press.
James Leach (1968). Historical Objectivity and Value Neutrality. Inquiry 11 (1-4):349 – 367.
Analytics
Monthly downloads
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
|
Added to index2011-12-11Total downloads0Recent downloads (6 months)0How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
