Metaphysical underdetermination: why worry?

Synthese 180 (2):205 - 221 (2011)
Various forms of underdetermination that might threaten the realist stance are examined. That which holds between different 'formulations' of a theory (such as the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics) is considered in some detail, as is the 'metaphysical' underdetermination invoked to support 'ontic structural realism'. The problematic roles of heuristic fruitfulness and surplus structure in attempts to break these forms of underdetermination are discussed and an approach emphasizing the relevant structural commonalities is defended.
Keywords Structural realism  Underdetermination  Classical mechanics  Surplus structure  Heuristics
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DOI 10.2307/41477553
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References found in this work BETA
F. A. Muller & Simon Saunders (2008). Discerning Fermions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):499-548.
Simon Saunders & F. A. Muller (2008). Discerning Fermions. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):499 - 548.

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Antigone M. Nounou (2015). For or Against Structural Realism? A Verdict From High Energy Physics. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 49:84-101.

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