|Abstract||Analytic philosophers specializing in medieval philosophy have tended to focus on those aspects of Catholic medieval thought that seem relevant to research programs already firmly established within the mainstream of contemporary academic philosophy. In this way they have tried to convince other philosophers that the Catholic medieval thinkers, despite their theological presuppositions, have something useful to contribute to current discussions.  The tendency in question has been especially pronounced in the case of William of Ockham because he is at his best when doing ontology and philosophical semantics, two areas that have figured prominently in recent analytic philosophy and that seem safely removed from distinctively Catholic beliefs.|
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