David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 12 (3):331-340 (2000)
No computer that had not experienced the world as we humans had could pass a rigorously administered standard Turing Test. We show that the use of “subcognitive” questions allows the standard Turing Test to indirectly probe the human subcognitive associative concept network built up over a lifetime of experience with the world. Not only can this probing reveal differences in cognitive abilities, but crucially, even differences in _physical aspects_ of the candidates can be detected. Consequently, it is unnecessary to propose even harder versions of the Test in which all physical and behavioral aspects of the two candidates had to be indistinguishable before allowing the machine to pass the Test. Any machine that passed the “simpler” symbols- in/symbols-out test as originally proposed by Turing would be intelligent. The problem is that, even in its original form, the Turing Test is already too hard and too anthropocentric for any machine that was not a physical, social, and behavioral carbon copy of ourselves to actually pass it. Consequently, the Turing Test, even in its standard version, is not a reasonable test for general machine intelligence. There is no need for an even stronger version of the Test
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Darren Abramson (2011). Philosophy of Mind Is (in Part) Philosophy of Computer Science. Minds and Machines 21 (2):203-219.
Robert French (2000). The Turing Test: The First Fifty Years. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (3):115-121.
Daniel Lim (2014). Brain Simulation and Personhood: A Concern with the Human Brain Project. [REVIEW] Ethics and Information Technology 16 (2):77-89.
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